

WORLD PRESS REVIEW

# Is the Real Aim The Status Quo?

A SOVIET ANALYSIS OF REAGAN'S MOTIVES

ПРАВДА

By GEORGI ARBATOV

**S**oviet-American relations have entered a complex and crucial stage. President Reagan's recent speeches have been marked by an intensely anti-Soviet tone — the kind to which we had begun to become disaccustomed. On the other hand, even during an anti-Soviet tirade, Reagan cannot conceal his desire to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on something (in this case, medium-range and tactical missiles) that would make it possible to hold a summit meeting.

An amusing paradox emerges. The U.S. seems to be extending an invitation, but in terminology once used to issue challenges to duels. The Americans seem to be assuring us that they will continue to be implacably hostile, but at the same time they are hinting: Do not take our attitude too seriously; we intend to work toward a treaty and a meeting.

These obvious contradictions provide food for thought. Above all, why does Ronald Reagan, despite the steadfastness of his anti-Soviet convictions, so badly need a summit meeting and an impressive agreement with the Soviet Union in the twilight of his presidency? One thinks primarily of Irangate, the political scandal that undermined the president's reputation, but I perceive other, deeper motives.

During his first years in office, Reagan decided that implacable hostility toward the U.S.S.R. and unbridled militarism were not working either at home or abroad. Those policies frightened the American people and generated opposition. Reacting to the mounting political protests, in 1982 Reagan returned to the negotiating table with the U.S.S.R. to discuss arms control and gave a pledge (which he broke four years later) to honor the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). He was convinced that he could not carry out a military buildup in the absence of some gesture designed to persuade the public of his readiness to reduce arms.

Unfortunately, the U.S. often uses negotiations to accelerate the arms race and to undermine resistance to military

preparations. The opposition is told, "We are striving for disarmament, but until there is something to sign, we have to arm ourselves." Before Reykjavik, the White House persuaded Congress — in order not to tie the President's hands at the summit meeting — to drop resolutions that modified military preparations. There is now talk in the U.S. that the President may repeat this maneuver.

One cannot reject the possibility that President Reagan's interest in a Soviet-American summit meeting and an arms agreement is based to some extent on honest motives. It is said that Reagan would like to go down in history as a great statesman, and that he believes that the most important criterion of political leadership is the ability to make a notable contribution to peace and to a reduction in nuclear arms. In this context, Reagan's latest speeches have been a harsh disappointment, because they embody not only the old anti-Soviet emotions but also certain political calculations.

What I have in mind is not simply the president's wish to butter up his critics on the right with his anti-Soviet rhetoric, nor a common human weakness — a reluctance to admit old mistakes — that compels the president to prove that he was always right in his policy and statements about the U.S.S.R. These things are not innocuous, but they probably are not dangerous, either. What is disturbing is that in placing such emphasis on anti-Sovietism precisely at this crucial point, the president seems to be confining future policy changes in Soviet-American relations to a narrow framework. A summit meeting? Yes. And if such a meeting requires an arms agreement, then maybe that will be necessary as well.

None of this is supposed to allow a summit meeting to become an important step forward in reducing arms or in détente. Isn't Reagan justifying the premise that in principle everything will and should remain as it was? The Americans have an expression — "self-fulfilling prophecy" — to describe predictions when the person making them is also intent on making them come true. Isn't that the plan of the American leader?

After Reykjavik, as if in revenge for the nearly reached agreement, Washington tore up SALT II. Are the Americans now taking aim at the last surviving agreement on nuclear arms, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, in order to remove all restrictions from the strategic arms race, both on Earth and in space?

President Reagan has begun to justify the tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations by making rude attacks on the Soviet Union. He calls this "candor" and says it contributes to the peace process. His presidency has been marked by provocations such as the malicious fabrication about the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons in Indochina and Afghanistan ("yellow rain"), the attempt to cast a shadow on the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria in connection with the assassination attempt on the Pope (the infamous "Bulgarian trail"), and the campaign in connection with the tragic demise of the South Korean plane. Such "candor" engenders nothing but mutual distrust and enmity.

*From the Communist Party daily "Pravda" of Moscow. Georgi Arbatov is director of the Institute for the Study of the U.S. and Canada.*



The contentiousness and effrontery of Reagan's latest speeches do not convey strength or self-confidence. Rather the opposite, these speeches portray a leader who has been forced by events to become defensive. With the changes in world attitudes that have accelerated thanks to new Soviet political initiatives, the politicians of the cold war suddenly find themselves languishing — like fish stranded on the sand during an ebb tide.

Leaders of this ilk have never had positive programs. They have always fought not for but against. Only with the existence of a "mortal enemy" have they been able to pass for great patriots. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, their careers were built on anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. It is difficult for them to adapt to everything that is meant in our country by *perestroika* (restructuring) and new political thinking, because they need the Soviet Union as an enemy.

Now that the old image of "the enemy" is being eroded as a result of profound changes in the Soviet Union, American politicians of the Reagan type are losing their foothold. They are beginning to get nervous. Hence the abuse; hence the strong language.

With the likelihood of arms negotiations in the near future, it is time for the darkness of prejudice and hostility in Soviet-American relations to give way to a dawn of realism and common sense. But when will that dawn come? ■



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## Caution and Doubt In Europe

ASSESSING GORBACHEV'S INTENTIONS

THE INDEPENDENT

By LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

**W**estern Europeans are sounding notes of caution following the announcement that the long-awaited intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty is almost ready for signature. We must not get euphoric, they insist. Relations with the East may be improving, but there is still a long way to go. Only a fraction of the world's nuclear arsenals will be removed through this agreement. The missiles to be scrapped will make a disproportionate dent in NATO strategy.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argues that there can be no more nuclear disarmament in Europe until the imbalance in conventional forces is corrected and something is done about chemical weapons. Her foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, describes the deal as "the beginning of the beginning." It is hard to be more cautious than that.

Yet Western leaders are aware of a mounting excitement that it might be possible to put East-West relations on a new footing. Few can doubt that the atmosphere has improved dramatically, but there remains great uncertainty as to how far the improvement can go. What underlies this caution is the fact that the West has yet to make up its mind about the Gorbachev phenomenon.

Since Mrs. Thatcher pronounced Mikhail Gorbachev to be someone she could "do business with," his competence and intelligence have never been in doubt. He appears to be a reformer, a pragmatist rather than an ideologue, anxious to open Soviet society, divert resources from military to civilian sectors, and relax international tensions. But doubts and suspicions still remain.

*Doubt one: Gorbachev is not a reformer.* Those suspicious of Gorbachev argue that he was chosen to represent the acceptable face of communism. He may be a stylish phrase-maker, able to hold his own with the Western media, but the prime Soviet objective is still to undermine liberal democracy and the Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, his domestic initiatives hardly amount to a reform of the system. For every dissident released, there are plenty still in prison.

From the daily "Independent" of London.



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NBC News

M E E T   T H E   P R E S S

Sunday, April 19, 1987

GUESTS:

RICHARD N. PERLE  
Assistant Secretary of State for  
International Security Policy

REPRESENTATIVE JIM WRIGHT (D., Tex.)  
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives

DR. GEORGI A. ARBATOV  
Director, U.S.A. and Canada Institute  
of the U.S.S.R.

MODERATOR:

Marvin Kalb - NBC News

PANEL:

Ann Garrels - NBC News  
Robert Kaiser - The Washington Post

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Mr. Kalb (on tape): "The issue for everyone these days is U.S.-Soviet relations, the chances of an arms control agreement, signed, sealed and delivered at another summit meeting later this year, the key spade work done in Moscow within recent days by Secretary of State George Shultz in his meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and by House Speaker Jim Wright in his meetings with top Kremlin leaders. Everyone knows any agreement of this sort must have Congressional support. Our guests today play major roles in this diplomatic drama: From Moscow, Dr. Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute on the USA and Canada, a member of the Supreme Soviet and a close advisor to Gorbachev; from West Berlin, the speaker of the House, Congressman Jim Wright of Texas, fresh from meetings with Gorbachev in Moscow; and, from Washington, the assistant secretary of defense, Richard Perle, one of the principal architects of this administration's policy on arms control. He was in Moscow this week. They are our guests today on 'Meet the Press,' Sunday, April 19th, 1987."

MR. KALB: Hello, and welcome once again. I'm Marvin Kalb. President Reagan has been in office now almost six and a half years, a very rocky road in U.S.-Soviet relations. But in the last 18 months he has met twice with Soviet leader Gorbachev and a third summit between them later this year now seems a distinct possibility, a summit to sign a new arms control agreement. Despite many ongoing problems in the super power relationship, the mood in both capitals is decidedly upbeat.

Joining me for our interviews today are two of my colleagues: Ann Garrels, who covered Secretary Shultz's mission to Moscow this week, NBC's State Department correspondent; and, Robert Kaiser, an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post and a student of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Dr. Arbatov, let's begin. I'd like to get your judgment, sir, of the mood in Moscow. Do you, yourself, feel that there is going to be a summit later this year and there will be a new arms control agreement signed?

DR. ARBATOV: It looks more possible, but I'm tremendously cautious. You know, the whole story of trying to reach an arms control agreement shows a major political asymmetry. All the time we don't take the American offer -- an answer -- and the Americans all the time don't take Soviet yes for an answer. And we balance up and then it looks better and then somebody throws in a monkey wrench and then it goes worse, so I am cautious. But I would say there was never such a chance given to any president of the United States as now to have really important steps in normalization of Soviet-American relations and putting an end to arms race. How it will be used, it's up to the United States.

MR. KAISER: Dr. Arbatov, there's a certain amount of confusion in Washington about the Soviet position. You seemed to have flip-flopped twice now in the last year. First, the INF European agreement was delinked from space weapons and strategic weapons. Then it got linked again in Reykjavik. Now, you've delinked again and said it's okay to have a separate European agreement. Why is the Soviet position bouncing back and forth this way?

DR. ARBATOV: Well, this is Robert Kaiser, I think.

MR. KAISER: That's right.

DR. ARBATOV: Yes. You know, you put it in a very wrong way, I think. I don't call it flip-flop, I call it real flexibility and attempt to untie the knot and really to open the way for the agreement. And the Americans made an opposite real flip-flop. We accept their proposal and then they say, no, they need something else. We say, okay, it's okay with something else, in this case, the smaller range weapons. And then another problem is there. Is not yet there. I hope it won't be there. But the usual way of this is such -- and this is just what I started with. We see, you know, the third participant in our talk today, Mr. Perle, I would call him not the principal architect of arms control policy. He is the principal monkey wrench thrower in the arms control machine. And there are a lot of such people.

I am always cautious. They invent something. They have



tremendous ingenuity in derailing arms control attempts and somehow freezing the atmosphere. They hope that the moment really comes when we'll have it.

MS. GARRELS: Mr. Arbatov, you've talked about flexibility. You've now proposed zero shorter range missiles. House Speaker Jim Wright suggests that you're willing to compromise this. Are you willing to allow the Europeans to match some of those shorter range missiles and not have zero, but at least a few?

DR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, actually -- actually, from the beginning it was your proposal. Your people said that the European complaint -- Europeans complained that you cannot do away with INF missiles in Europe, because Soviet Union -- that I remember Mrs. Margaret Thatcher very much -- how eloquent she was. You cannot do it because there is one to nine superiority -- nine to one superiority in favor of Soviet Union in the smaller range missiles. And we said, okay, let's do away with them. Now, they have a second thought.

MS. GARRELS: Well, what about that second thought?

DR. ARBATOV: Well, we don't have it at the table. I am absolutely sure by the way it is handled that there will be some hooks hidden in it which will simply derail it. Why not to do away with all of them? You know, you call it arms control. United States will have to create an absolutely new and very expensive weapons system in order to reach the ceiling and the Soviet Union proposes to do away in a very short period, after one year, with all its shorter range missiles so that United States of America will not be in need of creating this new weapons system. What is unfair here? It's not arms control what you propose. It's, you know, lowering the ceiling of Soviet weapons and creating new American weapons.

MS. GARRELS: So, Mr. Wright was wrong when he thought a compromise was in the wind?

DR. ARBATOV: I don't know what Mr. Wright thought. I think our position was reasonable. It was explained in presence



of Mr. Wright by Mr. Gorbachev. And he said that this is just unreasonable, if we propose to do away with the whole class of this weapons, to strive for creating some and please -- trying to perceive the Soviet don't do away with all of them, please keep them.

MR. KAISER: Mr. Gorbachev created a bit of a sensation here with his suggestion that the United States should create separate areas for blacks and other minorities. Is that what he really meant or did we misunderstand him?

DR. ARBATOV: Oh, no, no, it was somebody's invention. He doesn't interfere into your internal affairs. It's your habit to interfere in ours.

MR. KALB: Dr. Arbatov, I'm sorry, but our time is up for this particular segment. Thanks very much for being our guest today. In a moment, from West Berlin, the speaker of the House Jim Wright who followed Secretary Shultz into Gorbachev's office this week. "Meet the Press" returns right after these messages.

(Announcements.)

MR. KALB: We are back on "Meet the Press" with the speaker of the House, Congressman Jim Wright of Texas, who comes to us from West Berlin, and who met this week in Moscow with Gorbachev and other top Kremlin leaders. Mr. Speaker, you are quoted as saying at a news conference just before you left Moscow that this is the best opportunity since World War II to make real peace between the two super powers. What did you mean by real peace?

REP. WRIGHT: I think peace is not just the absence of armed conflict, but a condition of understanding and an effort on the part of both to try to accommodate the other. If I am any judge of things, this is the best opportunity we've had since World War II. Always before the leaders in the Kremlin were military men who believed in military spending as the be all and end all of their existence and they wanted to bury us with military spending.

I think now we have a new group, not just one man, but a group, urbane and sophisticated and articulate with some understanding

of our processes and some respect for our processes, men with a sense of humor, people who are willing to answer our questions very directly and to let us see all those things we asked to see, including Chernobyl. So, I think there is a better chance than there has been. I don't want to be a roseate in my predictions. We still have a long way to go. But I do discern a flexibility that hasn't been there before.

MR. KAISER: Are you suggesting, Mr. Speaker, that there's been really a fundamental change in the political culture of the Soviet Union that -- a system that used to depend entirely for much of legitimacy in strength on military power -- has suddenly changed its stripes and doesn't care about that any more?

REP. WRIGHT: Oh, no, I don't think we can say that the Soviet Union measures up to our standards of human rights. It surely doesn't. It never has. There's been some movement. We talked with Mr. Ligachev, the second in command and the director of party affairs, as I understand their system. I believe he told us that they are going to insist this year that there are a number of candidates for each office and not just one. They're attempting to create a greater degree of flexibility at the local level and plant management. They're trying to create some almost capitalistic systems of incentives for workers to improve their productivity and they're granting more freedom to writers. They have said that they have released thirteen hundred more people for immigration out of their country in the first three months of this year than they did in the first three months of last year.

All that's movement in the right direction, but it's like looking at a glacier. The Soviet Union is a huge ponderous thing. Any movement at all, I think, is significant.

MS. GARRELS: Mr. Wright, are you not concerned, though, with all this enthusiasm for an agreement with the Soviets that the pressure might be such that the U.S. will agree to an arms control agreement that is less than adequate, for instance, where verification is not what the U.S. originally wanted?



REP. WRIGHT: Well, I think there are people, of course, who do not want an arms control agreement. There are those who want to continue the cold war and the arms race. But we've reached a point where it's to our advantage, it seems to me, to get a legitimate arms control agreement, one that is mutual and is verifiable because then we can begin to make some dent in these huge deficits. We're spending \$300 billion this year on military weaponry and things of military might because we're afraid of what the Soviets would do to us if we didn't. They're spending a like amount, because I suppose in one sense they're afraid of what we'd do to them if they didn't and it's really insane isn't it? The world has enough explosives and enough nuclear weapons to blow all of us to kingdom come several times over and so it would just seem to make sense from our standpoint to try to get a little bit of a lessening in the demand for ever more military spending to keep up with the Soviet Union.

MR. KAISER: Mr. Speaker, some people here seem to get the impression that Gorbachev is sort of desperate to help Ronald Reagan, that he keeps changing his position in order to make a deal and help Reagan when he's down. What's your reading on Gorbachev's motivation?

REP. WRIGHT: Well, I don't think -- I don't think it's a personal matter. I think he's trying to move the peace process forward. There are reasons in his country why that makes sense to them, just as there are reasons in our country why it makes sense to us. Rather than each trying to spend the other into bankruptcy, I think it makes a lot of sense that we can divert some to letting kids go to college. You know, there are a lot of kids that are not going to get to go to college in the United States this year because we're spending so much on military weapons that we don't have enough money for student loans and grants. There are people going sick, that are not getting medical treatment, because we don't have enough for that. And I think they have the same problem that we do. And, so, if there is a more sensible reasonable

constructive approach on both sides where we can slowly build down our weapons so that they're still is a balance and there's safety for us, then it surely is to our advantage. I don't think we ought to leap at just any kind of an arrangement. We have to make sure that it's a good arrangement from our point of view, but I think the chances are better than they've ever been.

MR. KALB: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to try to clear something up. It is -- Gorbachev is quoted as having told you and other members of the Congress that he thinks that the United States ought to separate states for blacks, Puerto Ricans and Polish Americans.

REP. WRIGHT: No, that's ridiculous.

MR. KALB: Now, Dr. Arbatov said that that's pure fiction. Is it?

REP. WRIGHT: No, no. No, he didn't say anything like that. He's got more sense than that. After all, he's not foolish. He was talking in terms of what they are trying to do to create more integrity for their ethnic minorities in their country. He wasn't suggesting anything of the kind for us. He's got more sense than that. He made it clear that he understands that we have problems that are quite distinct and different from his and that he respects our system. He understands that Congress cannot negotiate and that we are in a supportive role for those in the administrative branch who negotiate. That we legislate and we appropriate. He has a good understanding of our system.

MR. KALB: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to ask you, finally, what are the major roadblocks, as you see it now, toward an agreement that would bring down to zero medium range and even the smaller shorter range?

REP. WRIGHT: I'm not sure there are major roadblocks. I think it depends upon the agreement of our Western allies. We're not going to abandon them. But I have been reading statements today here in West Berlin, this bastion of freedom. Many of our Western allies are very enthusiastic about the idea. Mr. Gorbachev indicated to us that he would be willing to consider either a



global zero-zero option or one that applied only to Europe or something in between and that he was flexible enough that he'd be willing to consider whatever ideas might be in the minds of our Western allies. So, it sounds to me as though there is at least a decent possibility that we can find that elusive thing called peace and it's a wonderful thing to contemplate on this Easter Sunday.

MR. KALB: Mr. Speaker, thanks very much for sharing your time with us on this Easter Sunday. Thanks very much, indeed. In a moment, joining us here in Washington, the assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle. "Meet the Press" will be back right after these messages.

(Announcements.)

MR. KALB: We are back on "Meet the Press" with the assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle who was in Moscow with Secretary Shultz this week and who is the key architect of this administration's policy on arms control. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Dr. Arbatov called you the principal monkey wrench thrower in this administration, so in that spirit, let me ask you what are the obstacles that you see toward reaching this kind of medium range agreement with the Soviet Union.

MR. PERLE: Well, there are some issues that we haven't closed on yet. One of them, and a very important issue, is verification. The Soviets have indicated in general terms that they are prepared to accept our verification proposals, but we don't have anything in writing yet. We don't have the details. And in negotiations of this sort, details are fundamental and until you have them, until the black and white is there and the "i's" are dotted and the "t's" are crossed you can't be sure that you've concluded a successful agreement.

MR. KALB: And what else?

MR. PERLE: We have to settle this question of how to treat shorter range missiles. The Soviets presently have a significant number of them and the United States has none deployed in Europe. The Soviets have responded to our proposals by suggesting that

they're prepared to eliminate theirs, even on a global basis, and this is now a matter for discussion with our allies. We don't impose our own views on our allies. We consult with them and that process of consultation has begun and should be concluded fairly rapidly.

MR. KAISER: A lot of skeptics around town, Mr. Perle-- who say there must be something funny going on if Richard Perle is cheering for arms control agreement. Why is this proposal that's on the table more acceptable to you than many of the predecessors that you've criticized?

MR. PERLE: Well, I think there are a lot of funny skeptics. This proposal to eliminate medium range missiles is one that this administration has supported from the very beginning, from November of 1981. The Soviets now make it appear as though this is a Soviet initiative. It was a Ronald Reagan initiative and it took a lot of people by surprise at the time and as I recall, one of the persistent criticisms at the time was that asking the Soviets to give up medium range missiles in Europe was so demanding that we knew they wouldn't agree and we had, therefore, advanced this proposal disingenuously. I think what has been demonstrated is that with perseverance and persistence, the Soviets can be brought to change their position.

MR. KAISER: Yeah, but when you proposed that, Mr. Secretary, there were no American medium range missiles in Europe. You were proposing an American zero for a lot of Soviet missiles.

MR. PERLE: Well, I don't think we could have achieved the outcome that is now in sight if we hadn't proceeded with that deployment.

MR. KAISER: I was just wondering who was being disingenuous in that description.

MR. PERLE: I think we set a very steady course back in 1981 and if an agreement results from this activity, we will have brought to fruition a proposal that a lot of people have said was impossible, non-negotiable.



MR. KAISER: But also a proposal which doesn't dramatically change the nuclear world. Will this sort of agreement, in your own mind, redeem the Reagan Administration policies in this field if after eight years the only thing you've done is restore a kind of pre 1965 balance in Europe? Is that a big accomplishment?

MR. PERLE: Well, I would happily contrast the Reagan administration management of our national security with previous administrations who permitted our defenses to deteriorate and concluded agreements not like the one we're looking at that would eliminate a category of weapons, but agreements that permitted significant increases in the numbers of weapons. So, I think we'll have a very solid record of accomplishment to leave to the next administration.

MS. GARRELS: But in terms of arms control, this is just one very small part. And the Soviets are still left with strategic weapons which can hit Europe. So, does this really make any difference. Is this just a political victory or does this really mean anything for arms control?

MR. PERLE: I think it makes a difference. It has to be seen in conjunction with other proposals, including the American proposal to reduce by 50 percent the number of strategic weapons.

MS. GARRELS: But those proposals, I gather, went really nowhere during your talks in Moscow, neither on SDI nor on strategic weapons. I mean, there's still just huge blocks left.

MR. PERLE: I think it's clear that the Soviets did not want seriously to discuss the 50 percent reductions and that ought to make us cautious. This isn't the millennium. The Soviets are not laying down their arms, peace isn't going to break out and contrary to Speaker Wright, we're not going to save vast sums of money by eliminating intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe.

On the contrary, in order to provide a more effective conventional military capability, because the Soviets have enormous advantages there, we may actually have to spend more rather than less in order to maintain a reasonable level of security there.

MR. KALB: Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Gorbachev present any new definitions of what acceptable research might be on strategic defense?

MR. PERLE: Well, they have offered a number of definitions that all have the same very dangerous bottom line. It would prevent the United States from continuing with the program of research and development and strategic defense. The Soviets believe in strategic defenses. They have defenses deployed now. They're busy at work on future defenses. They support all forms of defense except our program. And, so, while there are variations from one definition to the next, the bottom line is always the same, we would be compelled to terminate our SDI program.

MR. KAISER: Are you really saying that they're making proposals that would allow them to continue and us not to continue?

MR. PERLE: Oh, absolutely, because the proposals they're making are utterly unverifiable. We wouldn't know whether they were complying or not. And past history -- and we're not going to sweep past history away because the mood is a little more optimistic now. Suggests that when the Soviets find it in their advantage to violate agreements, they will go ahead and do so and I think we would have to anticipate that, particularly in an area as sensitive as what kind of research you can and cannot do.

MS. GARRELS: What about nuclear testing? This amazing idea that seems to have come out of the Soviet Union, that they would actually come here with their own nuclear device and detonate it in a Nevada desert and we would, in turn, go to the Soviet Union with a U.S. device. What would this prove? How would this advance the issue?

MR. PERLE: Well, if each of us tested one weapon, it would help us to calibrate seismic instruments with respect to other tests conducted at precisely the same site. It's not adequate. It's a first step. In order to get real verification of the present limit on nuclear testing, we need to be able to send teams to the Soviet Union and they have to send teams to the United States who



will stand by and measure the yield of those tests when they take place. That's the American proposal. If there is anything real to this Soviet notion of openness, they ought to accept that proposal, because there's no way it could do them any harm and it would give confidence that we knew the yield of their nuclear tests.

MR. KAISER: On a scale of one to ten, what's the odds of a summit and a deal in the next year?

MR. PERLE: Well, I would think the chances are quite good for a summit provided -- I think we have to be very careful in the end game -- because in the end game the details can go horribly wrong -- provided we settled the issue of verification and provided we get a satisfactory solution to the short range missile problem.

MR. KALB: Mr. Secretary, thanks very much. Our time is up. Thanks for being our guest today on "Meet the Press." We have certainly heard a good bit today about U.S. Soviet relations and the possibility of a new arms control agreement and at the moment things do look much better. But that is it for now. Thank you all for joining us. And we'll see you next Sunday.

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## FACE THE NATION

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GUESTS: GEORGI ARBATOV  
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(202) 347-2321



MS. STAHL: Welcome to FACE THE NATION, I'm Lesley Stahl. The Kremlin is releasing political dissidents from Soviet jails. At the same time, peaceful demonstrators in Moscow were being flogged and kicked by plainclothesmen. Soviet leader Gorbachev's new policy of openness appears to be here one minute, gone the next.

GENNADI GERASIMOV/TRANSLATOR: We are looking into softening the law so that fewer people are behind bars and behind barbed wire.

MS. STAHL: Sergei Gorgoriont and 140 other Russian dissidents were released from Soviet jails this week after pledging not to resume their political activities. And there were more signs of openness. Boris Pasternak's novel "Dr. Zhivago" will be published in the Soviet Union for the first time, and Gorbachev called for a more honest approach to Soviet history, including a re-evaluation of the rule of Joseph Stalin.

Now you see openness, now you don't. When foreign reporters tried to cover a demonstration this week in Moscow, plainclothesmen brutally attacked the protesters, as correspondent Wyatt Andrews reported on the CBS Evening News.

WYATT ANDREWS: The worst of the violence was suffered by Jewish "refusenik" Natasha Beckman, who was thrown to the ground and kicked, part of the time in full view of the uniformed militia, who took no action to stop the violence. As in previous days, much of the organized harassment was directed at Western reporters. The violence is subtle, usually kicks to the legs and punches to the kidneys.

MS. STAHL: The mixed signals continue. Andrei Sakharov gave what was described as a fearless speech to a group of visiting Americans in which he criticized human rights policies in his own country. Gorbachev seemed to be winning the global public relations war. As he was releasing dissidents this week, the news in Washington was that President Reagan was leaning toward a new interpretation of the ABM treaty that would allow the U.S. to go forward with SDI, or the Star Wars program.

How genuine is Gorbachev's campaign of democratization? We'll ask Georgi Arbatov, member of the Soviet Central Committee, and, in the U.S., Democrat Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Republican Richard Lugar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Russia's new openness, how will it affect U.S.-Soviet relations?--an issue facing the nation.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, FACE THE NATION, with CBS News National Affairs Correspondent Lesley Stahl.

This portion of FACE THE NATION is sponsored by the financial professionals at Paine Webber.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: Joining us now from Moscow, CBS News Moscow correspondent Wyatt Andrews. Wyatt, could you try to put some context into what has been happening in the Soviet Union? In the past week the Kremlin releases 140 dissidents. In the same week they send plainclothesmen in to brutally put down what appeared to be a peaceful demonstration. You were at that demonstration. How do you explain in your own mind the conflicting signals?

MR. ANDREWS: Lesley, there really is no way to explain it simply, because there's no -- because the process that the Soviets are seeing their country undergoing now is not a simple one. In fact, after the two reports we put on the evening news this week detailing how the plainclothesmen seemed to have some sort of authorization, we were even chided by some of the Jewish intellectual community here for not pointing out that -- what this evidenced; that is, the dissidents being released in the beginning of the week and the protesters and the newsmen being kicked at the end of the week -- how that was evidence that Mr. Gorbachev is not in complete control of the KGB. I just don't have the evidence on that either way.

What we are seeing clearly -- and your summation at the beginning of this broadcast summed it up very well--we are seeing a snapshot in the history of the development of openness in the Soviet Union. This is the tale of two countries. Both of these



images of the Soviet Union are genuine and true.

And I think whether or not Mr. Gorbachev ordered the crackdown on the protest this week, whether or not it was ordered at some level lower than that, almost misses the point. There is genuine democratization going on in the Soviet Union; I think we should all be impressed. At the same time we should be impressed with the fact that this is a process; he can't legislate it, no one can legislate it here overnight. And it is a process that will be glacial.

MS. STAHL: Wyatt, you were at the demonstration. I understand that our CBS crew was detained. Can you tell us exactly what happened? Were newsmen really hurt? Were the demonstrators, some of them women -- most of them women actually -- really hurt? What happened?

MR. ANDREWS: I'm not really sure, I'm not a good judge of that. I think that one of the Jewish women was hurt, I mean suffered bruises. It seemed to be the intent of the thugs that were out there not to hurt us; in fact, our sound man related an incident to me in which one of the thugs reared back with his fist and then held off with the obvious intent being that they were brutally and physically serious about us not taking pictures, but stopped short of actually inflicting physical harm, the kicks to the back and the kicks to the kidneys that our crew suffered were not serious enough to go to the hospital or anything like that. The intent was to stop us from taking pictures, again not to put us in any physical danger.

MS. STAHL: Wyatt, do you have any qualms about being completely honest right now in your reporting? Do you feel any limitation on what you can say as you report back from the Soviet Union?

MR. ANDREWS: None, absolutely none. There is no censorship of our reports from here. If Soviet television, for example, is not on board, if you will, with the report that we are about to put on the air, they have on occasion denied us the use of these

very facilities that I'm using right now, so there's indirect censorship in that sense. But once I get to these facilities I am under no pressure to say it their way.

MS. STAHL: Okay, thank you very much, Wyatt Andrews from Moscow. We will be back with a Soviet official in a moment.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: We go back to Moscow now to Georgi Arbatov, member of the Soviet Central Committee and a senior advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev on East-West relations. Mr. Arbatov, everyone in this country has been impressed with your policy of "glasnost," or openness, but we are now confused when we see television pictures of official plainclothesmen beating up peaceful demonstrators. How can you explain to us how these two incidents can happen in one week, brutal crackdown and release of 140 dissidents? What does it mean?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you have to put into proportion everything. A process is going on and Mr. Andrews, I think, grasped it in a correct way, it is a real process of democratization intended not at all to impress you -- we don't care too much about this, though we care, of course, to some degree. It's what we need, it's our problems, we have to sort them out. And so it's regarded here. On the other side, you had, you know, very strange things which many people here accept as a provocation just to make things more difficult. You know, Mr. Begune, because of whom all the demonstrations started, his case was in the process, you know, of re-assessment, and he would have been free several days ago wouldn't it be for this demonstration. He is free now, I can tell you--well, the resolution ---

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MS. STAHL: He is?

MR. ARBATOV: Yes, it's already done.

MS. STAHL: Let's explain who he is.

MR. ARBATOV: I think it is correctly done.

MS. STAHL: Let's explain, if we can, who he is.

MR. ARBATOV: That despite this provocation, we did it.



MS. STAHL: Mr. Arbatov, let's explain who Mr. Begune is. He is one of the Jewish dissidents who was in jail, one of the few who was not released.

MR. ARBATOV: I'm not a specialist in this, I don't know much. Only one thing, I made a telephone call just now before it -- and I got the news that his case was resolved. And what happened there, you know, it's really like provocation. The first thing, these are guesses about plainclothesmen -- were they plainclothesmen or not? Maybe were, maybe not. Then, you know, you take this case, demonstration, were there were, the last demonstration, seventeen demonstrators, forty-two foreign correspondents, six people from the embassies. And look what you had in Nevada? You have arrested more than 400 people. It goes very well that the most democratic society, nobody raises hell about it. Now here something happened, something happened and I don't think these people behaved in a correct way. We have certain rulings and laws you have to apply for the right to demonstrate, et cetera, and they could be hooligans who attacked them, I don't know.

But, you see, I think this provocation, it really achieved the goal. We speak now about what, not about process of democratization, which is close to millions and millions; we speak about this one lady who had bruises and a couple of American newsmen, who I'm sorry for them, who got some beating.

MS. STAHL: Well, that's the point. Why did you allow that to happen? Mr. Arbatov, that's the point.

MR. ARBATOV: You know, our correspondents get ---

MS. STAHL: Let me ask you a question. That's the point, we in the United States wonder why you allowed pictures of such a brutal attack on women to be broadcast when you were establishing so much good will through your openness policy and democratization, as you call it. Does this show that Mr. Gorbachev is not in control of the KGB? Explain to us how it could have happened?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, it's a game, part of this attempt just to interfere with the normal process of development

in our country, to make such conclusions.

MS. STAHL: Will you explain it to us?

MR. ARBATOV: You know, you had in Philadelphia a very bad case when you bombed a house, the police bombed a house and it led to tremendous fire -- you remember it. Can we out of it draw a conclusion that all your officials are terrorists and the President can do nothing with the terrorists and all your authorities cannot? Some things happen, and our Izvestia correspondent in Washington is harassed for a long time; our TV correspondent in London was beaten up, his camera was destroyed, because he wanted to film the strikers at Murdoch's press empire. And there were no excuses even.

MS. STAHL: Will those people be disciplined? Did they do something they shouldn't have done?

MR. ARBATOV: Excuse me?

MS. STAHL: Were the people who beat up the American newsmen, will they be disciplined, did they do something they should not have done?

MR. ARBATOV: You know, I don't know who these people were. I can imagine they could have been hooligans.

MS. STAHL: Well --

MR. ARBATOV: Because -- yes, well.

MS. STAHL: Well --

MR. ARBATOV: This demonstration went on for one day after another -- don't laugh, Lesley. I can assure you that in Moscow you can find several dozens of people when they hear that something is happening somewhere, they will be there and try to interfere.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Arbatov, can we change the subject for a second, because we are very interested in "glasnost" in this country, and I think a lot of people who have been there have come back and said they are impressed with the process. Let me ask you a question before I invite ---

MR. ARBATOV: Speak slowly, I hear very bad.

MS. STAHL: I will speak slowly. Can you tell us exactly



what the new emigration policy is? Will Jewish "refuseniks" now be allowed to emigrate to Israel or anywhere else? And how many will you allow to do that?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, it is again an individual case, it is not a mass action when we kick out a certain number of people. The individual cases are being resolved, and they will be resolved. And this is part of the policy. And there are quite a number of cases which were resolved lately. Well, the whole process, you know -- there are great changes here in internal policy which cover all the field of economic policy, social policy, what we call "glasnost," and it has become already an international word, democratization of the country, et cetera. And I would prefer not to interfere with it, and not to make such provocation. I, by the way, would recommend you to read the latest, last edition from 9th of February of TIME magazine and an article by Yevtushenko, who just remembers how the late Senator Robert Kennedy told him that -- you remember maybe in the sixties we had the political process of Sinyovski and Daniel. Under pen names they published in the West some articles which were regarded slanderous here and they were put to trial. So Senator Kennedy told to Yevtushenko how it happened. He said that our -- it means American secret police -- has given it to the Soviet secret police the real names of Sinyovsky and Daniel. And he says here in the magazine that he has not yet -- he cannot yet tell the whole story. And why they did it? Just because they wanted to focus the attention of the public on this fabricated case.

MS. STAHL: Okay, Mr. Arbatov, we have two members of Congress who would like to join us in this discussion. Joining us from Indianapolis is Senator Richard Lugar, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and here in Washington, Representative Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Congressman Fascell, let me ask you your impression of the openness that we are observing in the Soviet Union, including the attack that took place on the demonstrators, and ask how you

think this will affect U.S.-Soviet relations, if it will at all.

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Well, I think our approach is cautious optimism. The General Secretary has certainly gone beyond rhetoric and he deserves a great deal of credit for doing what he's done. But, again, as Mr. Arbatov says, we have got to put it in perspective; and, as Wyatt said, we saw both faces of the Soviet Union in the same week -- and that's not going to go away. This is an evolving matter and I agree with that and I think it's going to take some time before we can really decide what is happening.

MS. STAHL: All right, Senator Lugar, in Indianapolis, what are your impressions of what's going on and how do you think it's going to affect U.S.-Soviet relations?

SENATOR LUGAR: Lesley, I've made two points. I think that the Soviets have decided that democracy works and that economic progress is unlikely without democracy. The problem is how to open the door just a crack without it blowing open, and it appears to me that the Soviets are doing just that, they are opening it a crack. They have very heavy controls to make sure it doesn't get away from them. But the admission that they've got to go the democratic route, even if merely an internal thing at present.

MS. STAHL: All right, gentlemen, why don't we take a short break and we will all come back, Mr. Arbatov, in Moscow, Senator Lugar, and Congressman Fascell, when we return.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: Continuing our discussion with Congressman Fascell, Senator Lugar, and Georgi Arbatov.

Congressman Fascell, we've been talking about how openness in the Soviet Union might affect U.S. relations, but let me ask you about how you think President Reagan's policy on the ABM treaty, trying to interpret it, have a broader approach to it, might affect arms control, and what your views of the president's policy are.

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Well, I'm not for a unilateral



broadening of the interpretation of the ABM treaty along with an early decision with regard to deployment of SDI. I think that's a mistake. I think a proper position is one we've already taken, which is that two countries have appointed a task force to at least discuss the problem. I just don't want to see us get so far out in front that we force the Soviets into some retaliatory position.

MS. STAHL: Well, what about SDI? Do you think it's something that we should attempt to continue? Should we try to readjust the ABM treaty in some way so that we can go forward with that program?

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Well, I've certainly supported research and the majority of the Congress in both parties have supported research. The problem starts with the re-interpretation of the ABM treaty which leads to testing and development that goes beyond the normal interpretation or the interpretation that we've had of the ABM treaty up till now and coupled with the decision for early deployment of an SDI system.

MS. STAHL: Well, let me ask Senator Lugar, can we go forward with SDI if we don't in some way change the ABM treaty? And, if that's true, why not just withdraw from the treaty if we want to go forward with SDI?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, I'm certain that we need to develop the SDI, and eventually that would require, it seems to me, some re-interpretation of the ABM treaty. I think the debating on that issue of first negotiations leads to ambiguous results; we ought to have consultation with Congress and with our allies, and obviously visit with the Soviets about this. But we need to proceed with the SDI. I think the Soviets will proceed with theirs. And we are going to enter into a new era beyond the balance of terror by getting into defensive weapons. And I think that requires re-interpretation of the ABM treaty.

MS. STAHL: Well, why not just withdraw then?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, because we are attempting to negotiate with the Soviets at several different levels. We are

attempting to observe treaty obligations and I think we are being faithful in that regard. We are simply just reviewing the negotiating record back in 1972 and elsewhere in which it was the Soviets who apparently wanted a broader interpretation at that point while we wanted a narrower one. Things seem to have changed a bit at this point, and I think a full consultation with everybody may result at least in a satisfying arrangement.

MS. STAHL: All right, let's go back to Moscow and bring Mr. Arbatov in. Apparently Mr. Gorbachev is going to be giving a major speech tomorrow on Moscow television, Mr. Arbatov. Western observers say since it will be televised it will be a major speech with some new initiatives. Can you give us a little preview?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, I can hardly hear you. I have to make my guess about what you asked me. You asked me about tomorrow, Gorbachev's speech, as I understand.

MS. STAHL: Yes.

MR. ARBATOV: He will have a speech tomorrow.

MS. STAHL: What will he say? Will he have any new proposals, any new arms control proposals, that you can tell us about?

MR. ARBATOV: You have to wait till tomorrow. I don't think we should introduce new proposals. You have not answered to our latest proposals, and the ball is in the American garden. As to interpretation, you know, I'm astonished that people in your country use such a euphemism. You want to, you know, tear the treaty, to break it, and you use the word "interpretation." As to what Senator Lugar has said, it is not true, there is a forum on security and disarmament in Moscow at this moment; many Americans take part, including some who negotiated the ABM treaty. It was the commentary proven that this interpretation is the historic one, and the Russians didn't interpret it in a different way. It is proven fact and these are again some fantasies which are being circulated there.

I wanted also to comment -- one of the comments of Senator Lugar who spoke about open society being in the United



States, as I heard it, and closed society being here. I think during the "Irangate" discussion, it is not very persuasive that you are such an open society.

MS. STAHL: All right, Senator Lugar, can you respond, particularly on the broadening of the ABM treaty, because I think that is going to be a major issue between our two countries.

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, it is a major issue, and at the Reykjavik summit we discussed SDI obviously, and this entire situation. It just occurs to me that our position in the United States is to try to encourage Soviet friends to think in terms of defensive weaponry as opposed to preoccupation with offensive weaponry, and that is going to require some development and testing of our defensive mechanisms. I think the Soviets will require that, too. I do not see this as a block, but it seems to me clearly we are headed eventually toward testing. We ought to do so with eyes wide open and with full consultations. But I think the ABM treaty gives us that opportunity, at least that is the assertion that we ought to make.

MS. STAHL: All right, let me explain to our viewers, if I can, that our satellite to Moscow has gone down. It was not something that the Soviet Union did. Apparently there was some mix-up on the times that we asked for this satellite, so Mr. Arbatov is no longer with us. So let me turn to Congressman Fасcell.

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: That's too bad.

MS. STAHL: It is too bad -- and ask you if we, as a country -- and has Congress decided that we do want to go forward with SDI -- and if that doesn't, in fact, mean that we are going to have to either negotiate a change in the ABM treaty or withdraw from it? I mean, isn't that simple logic?

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Well, certainly if we go ahead with testing and development, it flies in the face of the former interpretation of the ABM treaty. We have a problem as to whether or not we are in it or out of it. The debate still goes on as to what the interpretation is. And, again, when you couple that with

the decision -- and, frankly, I don't know why the decision was made to state that we are going to compress the time for deployment at a time when we can't begin to deploy -- I don't know why we are saying now we are going to step up the time for deployment when deployment will be some time after this administration, and we have no idea what the deployment's about or what kind of system it will be.

MS. STAHL: Senator, why are we engaged in this problem right now? Why can't we wait two or three years before we try to broaden the treaty?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, we may. I don't think that there is any necessary compression here. Clearly there are persons within the administration who believe that we ought to have testing and deployment sooner rather than later, perhaps to ensure that the SDI continues. Maybe there is fear that there is now sufficient bipartisan cooperation to have sustaining power. I would hope that we would work to make sure there is that kind of bipartisan cooperation, because we need the SDI, and perhaps we need to negotiate among ourselves a little bit more to make certain we've got that kind of consensus.


MS. STAHL: Okay, thank you very much, Senator Lugar, Congressman Fascell. Our cartoon this week is from Pat Oliphant of Universal Press Syndicate. President Reagan seeks out his predecessor. "What is the answer," he asks.

I'm Lesley Stahl, have a good week.

ANNOUNCER: This portion of FACE THE NATION was sponsored by the financial professionals at Paine Webber and by Apple Computer, personal computers that give you the power to be your best.

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CBS NEWS  
2020 M Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036  
(202) 457-4321

FACE THE NATION

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MODERATOR: Lesley Stahl - CBS News National Affairs  
Correspondent

GUESTS: DONALD T. REGAN  
White House Chief of Staff  
  
GEORGI ARBATOV  
Member, Soviet Central Committee

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Karen Sughrue  
  
PRODUCER: Jeanne Edmunds  
  
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Transcript by: RLS Reporting Associates  
733 15th Street, N.W., Suite 440  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
(202) 347-2321

MS. STAHL: Welcome to FACE THE NATION. I'm Lesley Stahl. The Reagan White House is trying to disprove that old adage that first impressions are the ones that last. The first impressions of the Iceland summit, grim faces, dashed hopes, collapse.

GEORGE SHULTZ (Secretary of State): There is a great sense of disappointment, at least at this meeting. A tremendous amount of headway was made, but, in the end, we couldn't quite make it. We are deeply disappointed at this outcome.

MS. STAHL: But the President and his men drew up a plan to erase that sense of failure. They decided upon some heavy-duty damage control, a media blitz with a positive spin on what had happened in that haunted house in Reykjavik.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: We are no longer talking about arms control; we are talking about arms reductions, possibly even the complete elimination of ballistic missiles from the face of the earth.

MS. STAHL: Only a few Democrats spoke out.

REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS DOWNEY (D.-N.Y.): The President came within a whisper of getting an agreement and held it all up because he wanted to pursue his dream of "Star Wars."

MS. STAHL: But the polls showed overwhelming backing of the President in his refusal to give up "Star Wars," so now Mr. Reagan is using that as a campaign weapon.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: SDI is the key to a world free of nuclear blackmail. Don't let liberals in Congress throw it away.

MS. STAHL: Yet Senator Sam Nunn worried that the President put the U. S. at a military disadvantage by agreeing to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

Did he? We'll ask his chief of staff, Donald Regan. And we will talk with Soviet spokesman, Georgi Arbatov, about the Kremlin's new willingness to allow dissidents to emigrate and about the future of the arms control talks.

The superpowers after Iceland, where do we go from here--an issue facing the nation.

-ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, FACE THE NATION, with National Affairs Correspondent Lesley Stahl.



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(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: Joining us, our guest, White House chief of staff, Donald Regan.

Mr. Regan, a report has just come over the wires that the Soviets have expelled five American diplomats from the U. S. embassy in Moscow; they've accused them of being spies.

What can you tell us about it?

MR. REGAN: Well, I've just heard the same reports myself. I understand we have been notified that our embassy in Washington--in Moscow--that they are going to expel these five people. I'm disappointed to see that. I thought that after Reykjavik relationships would have improved somewhat. Nevertheless, we are now going to have to consider taking appropriate action.

MS. STAHL: What do you mean by that?

MR. REGAN: Well, we'll have to consider what our alternatives are.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Regan, they are responding to our expelling twenty-five of their people from the U. N. Is this now going to escalate?

MR. REGAN: Well, remember that we told them back in March that we were going to cut down the size of their U. N. mission, because they have too many spies there. We want every six months so many of them to come out, and we are going to pursue that, in addition to whatever else we have to do as a result of this action.

MS. STAHL: Well, first we had the summit, and everybody thought it was a failure. Now, this week, they are trying to tell us that it was a success, but now we are going back and we are going to have expulsions and retaliation and counter-expulsions. Where does this put U.S.-Soviet relations at this point?

MR. REGAN: Well, you've got to remember that U.S.-Soviet relations are not a smooth road; they always will be rocky, because we don't see things exactly alike. And we'll try to reach agreements with them, but we certainly are not just going to give in because

they want something or they threaten us.

MS. STAHL: Let me understand this. They have expelled five, you said in six months we are going to expel more from the U. N. But are you saying that something in addition, some additional retaliation, will be required because of the five they've expelled today?

MR. REGAN: Well, since this report has just come in, we haven't had time to sit down to think through exactly what we should do. All I'll say is we will think it through and come up with an appropriate reply.

MS. STAHL: Now there are reports that perhaps the Soviets are willing to rethink their demand at the Reykjavik summit that the United States can only test SDI in the laboratory. Was this transmitted to the President in a letter from Mr. Gorbachev? How is this being transmitted, and what is the U. S. response to these new feelers?

MR. REGAN: Well, first of all, there's been no letter from Mr. Gorbachev to the President since Iceland and the Reykjavik meeting. There have been hints delivered to some of our negotiators that perhaps they could discuss further the SDI and its testing. I think what this means is that they want to explore the meaning of the ABM treaty. I think that what has happened here is in Reykjavik they came up with a new interpretation where they didn't want any deployment under the ABM treaty, which is certainly something that, with due notice, is allowed now. And they seemed to be insisting upon a very narrow interpretation of that 1972 treaty.

So at this point I think what each side has to explore is just what do you mean by the ABM treaty.

MS. STAHL: Well, is there any possibility that you misunderstood Mr. Gorbachev and he didn't really mean to suggest it could only be tested within the confines of a laboratory, and perhaps did you all make a mistake in not pursuing this line a little further over there?

MR. REGAN: No. As we understood it--and, remember, the President and the Secretary of State were there with him--neither



one of them thinks that they misunderstood exactly what he was saying. They got the impression that he was going much further in wanting to kill off our strategic defense against nuclear missiles--and it is a strong need for that if we are going to do away with all of the missiles, because it leaves us defenseless if neither side has missiles against either cheating by the other side or by a third country having a missile with a nuclear tip on it. What do we do in that case if we have no missiles to reply?

MS. STAHL: Well, I want to talk to you about all these proposals to reduce missiles, but let's stay with SDI testing for one minute.

Is it possible that the two sides could agree to just abide strictly by the ABM treaty as it was written and that a deal could be worked out along those lines? Is that what our negotiators are discussing at Geneva? And if that's agreed to, is everything else that was discussed at Reykjavik on paper? Are we ready to have a summit?

MR. REGAN: The final proposal that President Reagan put on the table said exactly that, Lesley. What it said was that we would observe the ABM treaty for ten years, and that we would proceed with the things that that treaty allows us to do in the area of research, in the area of development, in the area of testing of a system, and that, at the end of the ten years, we would discuss with them, before we deploy, whether or not they wish to share it.

MS. STAHL: Well, what about testing? Do you see some room for compromise over the definition of a laboratory?

MR. REGAN: Well, we believe that the ABM treaty allows us to test, that it has never been in that treaty that you cannot test except in a laboratory.

MS. STAHL: But could you redefine "laboratory," make it a broader definition, and then satisfy the U. S. side?

MR. REGAN: Well, this has got to be a subject of discussion in Geneva.

MS. STAHL: You mentioned sharing. Armand Hammer, as

you know, just went to the Soviet Union and brought the dissident David Goldfarb out. He is making a proposal that President Reagan offer to share SDI not after we've developed it but immediately, to propose that U. S. and Russian scientists work together to develop SDI.

Is that at all a possibility?

MR. REGAN: Well, we've already suggested that. We suggested that in the testing phase, as soon as we were ready to test, that we would ask them to come over, observe our tests, participate in our tests, and there they could see exactly what we have and what we're doing. And that certainly would come before the deployment.

MS. STAHL: Well, what about letting them come into the laboratory?

MR. REGAN: Well, that's a matter of negotiation. They've been going on now for seven years in their research into some type of strategic defense against missiles, and what's happened? They haven't shared that with us.

MS. STAHL: Let's talk about the reduction of nuclear weapons. Apparently Mr. Reagan inadvertently agreed at some point during these talks to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons on both sides.

Is that where we left it with Mr. Gorbachev?

MR. REGAN: Well, let's get that point clear, because there is no inadvertent agreement. What happened was that after we put our final proposal on the table, they said why ballistic missiles? That's what Mr. Gorbachev said. And he said why not everything? And the President said, well, exactly what do you mean by that? And he said let's have everything. And the President said, well, if that's what you want to talk about, all right, but--and at that point they launched into a discussion of SDI and the proposals to kill it. So they never went back to that. So it just came up momentarily, wasn't thrashed out, there is no meeting of the minds on it or anything of that nature, and the subject was dropped because they came to the impasse on the strategic defense.



MS. STAHL: Well, if you did eliminate everything, the Soviets would have an advantage of conventional weapons, so ---

MR. REGAN: Well, first of all, I wouldn't agree with that, because, while they might have some numerical superiority, I do think our troops and many of our weapons are superior to theirs. Secondly, we would have ten years, if we had to live in that type of atmosphere, without nuclear weapons.

But doesn't it startle you that now we have people who have been for getting rid of nuclear weapons suddenly worried that we might indeed get rid of nuclear weapons? Just think of what they called Reagan when he first came in, the bomb-thrower and all this. Here's the man now--so far the people say, whoa, back up. Hasn't that really changed thinking?

MS. STAHL: Ronald Reagan the "peacenik," huh?

MR. REGAN: You got it.

MS. STAHL: But people are saying you didn't think it through, that you went there, that Mr. Gorbachev surprised you, that you were trapped and ensnared, got you talking about all these issues that you really weren't ready for--and you all admit you were surprised by it. And in fact there have been some pieces written today that say thank goodness it fell through because you were all going down a path that would have hurt the United States and put us at a military disadvantage.

MR. REGAN: Well, first of all, that really startles me that people would write that, because isn't it better to have a nuclear-free world than a world with nuclear weapons? And this is what Reagan wanted.

MS. STAHL: Well, not if we are at a disadvantage actually.

MR. REGAN: Just a minute. Before ---

MS. STAHL: But answer that. If we are at a disadvantage, why is it worth ---

MR. REGAN: Well, we won't be at a disadvantage--just listen to me for a minute. What has happened is we would have at least ten years, and probably longer than that, in which to build up our conventional weapons to at least have equality, which is

what we would want. So that we don't have to think of ourselves as being at the moment at a disadvantage, yes--but this wouldn't happen tomorrow; this is going to happen for years to come, and by that time our Joint Chiefs and others will think through our battle strategy, if indeed we ever have to use it.

MS. STAHL: All right, but we have to spend massive amounts of money. Conventional forces are much more expensive than nuclear. And what about the idea that you haven't thought it through? You are saying now we should have our Joint Chiefs and other people brought in; you didn't bring them in before you even began discussing it.

MR. REGAN: Well, there, again, Ronald Reagan has been expounding this theme since 1976, and certainly in the 1980 campaign he brought it out.

MS. STAHL: But no one has taken him seriously.

MR. REGAN: They don't, but they should take this man seriously. He is serious, he is a man of peace, he is a man who wants to see a nuclear-free world.

Now perhaps we didn't go through every "i" and every "t" on that, but there is certainly plenty of time to do that over the next decade or longer.

MS. STAHL: Okay, we don't have a lot of time, and I do have some other questions.

SALT--are we going to go over the limits of SALT?

MR. REGAN: Well, we haven't yet, and we'll see what happens.

MS. STAHL: We are not going to go over the limits of SALT.

MR. REGAN: Well, let's see what happens.

MS. STAHL: Was that discussed at all?

MR. REGAN: Well, we first of all don't recognize SALT as a treaty. It was never passed by the Senate, it is not a treaty, it is not in existence. And even it had been passed by the Senate, it would have expired at the end of last year.

So why do you insist that we keep in with a treaty that doesn't exist?

MS. STAHL: Well, I'm not insisting on anything; I'm



trying to find out if you agreed with Mr. Gorbachev not to go over the limits, and if you are going to abide by that.

MR. REGAN: Well, all we've said is we don't recognize SALT II, we will not be bound by those limits. But at the current moment we are in compliance.

MS. STAHL: And it probably will stay there?

MR. REGAN: Well, let's see what happens.

MS. STAHL: All right, what about a summit?

MR. REGAN: I think there's a possibility of a summit. Probably now the time has slipped as far as having one in '86, but I think that so much progress was made in Reykjavik that we now need to narrow these final differences and then see what we can actually agree upon, what sort of papers could be signed at a summit, since this is apparently what Mr. Gorbachev wants, and then proceed with it.

MS. STAHL: This is what--Mr. Gorbachev wants a summit.

MR. REGAN: Well, I think so; that's what he said, he hasn't denied it, and he also said, however, that he wanted the differences narrowed and he wanted some papers to sign. I think the differences have been narrowed.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Shultz said, right after the Reykjavik meeting, that a summit was not in the cards. You are saying it is now.

MR. REGAN: Well, he was talking about in the short term. I agree with him, it wasn't for the short term.

MS. STAHL: What about April?

MR. REGAN: Well, we haven't set any date, we haven't discussed anything of that nature. But, you know, what I'm saying is I think it's a possibility that there can be a summit.

MS. STAHL: Have you heard anything from the Soviets that suggests that Mr. Gorbachev wants to put that whole idea back on track?

MR. REGAN: I think that the Soviets have come into Geneva with a willingness to talk, so, if they want to talk and reach agreements, we can do it.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Regan, thank you very, very much. We will be back with Georgi Arbatov in a moment.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: With us now from Moscow, Georgi Arbatov, a member of the Soviet Central Committee.

Good morning, Mr. Arbatov.

MR. ARBATOV: Good morning.

MS. STAHL: Now we have reports that the Kremlin has expelled five Americans from the U. S. embassy there in Moscow. Mr. Regan says the U. S. will have to consider retaliation.

What kind of a path is this leading us down, sir?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, I think that the Americans will--Mr. Gorbachev is a very forthcoming man, if he has good partners. But if you behave in such a way, he becomes very tough; it can cool down to zero in both countries, if you go this way of retaliation after retaliation. You started a very bad thing. Mr. Reagan has justified the nature of it, but it was contrary to the agreements the United States has with United Nations, just to declare how many people each country can have in its United Nations mission.

MS. STAHL: So these five are being expelled in retaliation for the twenty-five at the U. N. being expelled, is that what you are saying?

MR. ARBATOV: I don't know, I don't know. They were--well, the situation looks as the situation looks. But, you know, if the Americans say they think there are too many spies in our United Nations mission, we can say that in our opinion there are too many spies in American embassy in Moscow.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Arbatov, how would you describe the state of U.S.-Soviet relations right now? After Reykjavik things looked pretty dismal. Both your side and the United States side has been talking more optimistically, but now we are talking about expulsions and retaliation.

How would you describe the state?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, expulsions are really a small thing,



small thing. What we are concerned about is the whole stance of America, of United States Administration, especially after Reykjavik. You know, this attempt to sacrifice, you know, really big issues and national interest to petty politicking, to electoral considerations--the whole campaign, public relations campaign, very slick public relations campaign with which the Administration tries to make up for very bad statesmanship in Reykjavik--it makes us concerned; it shows that Americans are not serious.

MS. STAHL: Well, but I also hear now that Mr. Gorbachev is willing to talk about a different proposal on SDI testing, that perhaps he's not as strict about ---

MR. ARBATOV: I have not heard a thing about it. I think all of this, you know, is a bit irrational, what you do with SDI, as if you have something. You actually have nothing and will have nothing. The President talks about SDI as if it is on his shelf, but it won't be there for decades. And when President says that he cannot sacrifice the security of American people and America's allies from nuclear attack, he just talks many strange things, because ---

MS. STAHL: Clear this up for us. We had several reports over the last two days that your country has sent signals that you are willing to talk about the definition of laboratory testing for SDI, that you are willing now to have a broader definition than presented in Reykjavik. Is that not true?

MR. ARBATOV: I don't know; I think about product definition--we are ready to talk about it; we have not cut off our dialogue. But I think, after all the proposals we made--by the way, Mr. Regan was not quite accurate, you know. It was so soothing to hear him describing Mr. Reagan as a "peacenik." But it just doesn't correspond with our impression that we got in Reykjavik, because there was not a single proposal coming from American side--and this is, excuse me, not true: there were no proposals from American side, the Americans have come to Reykjavik emptyhanded with empty pockets, and all the proposals were ours.

And we have still to decide what actually was there.

Was it just that the SDI idea was so dear to the President, or SDI was a pretext? I can of course understand that it is dear to the President. I think Benjamin Franklin said once that old boys have their playthings as well as young ones, the difference is only in price. The price of SDI might be three trillion dollars.

MS. STAHL: It's wonderful that you're quoting Benjamin Franklin, sir. But let's get to what's happening ---

MR. ARBATOV: We have great respect to the gentleman, to your founding fathers in general.

MS. STAHL: Well, hats off to you for reading about our great statesmen of the past, but let me ask you about the future and what's coming up in Geneva.

Is there a possibility, in your view, that there can be some compromise on the SDI question, the testing question, the laboratory question, and that this whole negotiation--what was agreed to, what was conceded, what the two leaders came down to--can be back on track and that Mr. Gorbachev can accept an invitation to come to the United States for a summit perhaps in April?

MR. ARBATOV: I think we have compromised--well, you can never say that everything, you know--who knows, it depends on other issues--but pretty much like everything what we could on SDI, because if we discuss how to get rid of all nuclear weapons, what do we need the SDI for?

MS. STAHL: Was there an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons? As far as I understand, there was no agreement on that.

MR. ARBATOV: There was no agreement. There was what we proposed actually--there were no agreements. We proposed in written form--here I have this documents, "Directive for Ministers of Foreign Affairs"--you know, your public, I think, got a lot of polls, but never, never real explanation of the facts.

MS. STAHL: Well, tell us.

MR. ARBATOV: So they asked what is your opinion; your public doesn't know what's going about. What we proposed actually was to cut all strategic weapons by 50 percents in five years, and



then go on with the negotiations. And here, I think, in the discussion the question has arisen, because Gorbachev has proposed already in January to get rid of all nuclear weapons till the end of the century. And I think what has really happened, they decided that maybe we can do it with strategic weapons at least, maybe also with INF and some other weapons--we can get rid of them in ten years.

And then your side said we will have SDI nevertheless. I don't know, why do you need SDI if you have nothing to defend yourself from? This, you know--is it nonsense about madman or about hiding something, because SDI--would it even succeed, which is highly improbable. Can save you only from ballistic missiles, not from cruise missiles, not from airplanes. And a madman would most probably not have an IBM.

MS. STAHL: Let me ask you once more about a possibility of an understanding between the two governments on the question of SDI testing, if there can be, in your view, some kind of a negotiation, a compromise, and an agreement on what kind of testing would be allowed in ten years ---

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, if the President needs some face-saving device, we could provide him with some, I think.

MS. STAHL: What would you provide?

MR. ARBATOV: We tried already--that he can have laboratory, not only research but testing. But, you know, here we have to be clear in essence, because what we understand why the Americans insist so much on SDI is because they do want a new round of arms race. You cannot have both, get rid of your nuclear weapons and invest billions and tens of billions in a new weapons race.

MS. STAHL: We are fast running out of time. Very quickly, do you see any compromise, any wiggle room, on the question of what a laboratory is?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, it can be clarification--and, well, you know, I think ---

MS. STAHL: There's hope on that front?

MR. ARBATOV: --- the treaty is tremendously strict and

clear on that.

MS. STAHL: Okay.

MR. ARBATOV: You cannot put anything in outer space of ABM.

MS. STAHL: Okay, Mr. Arbatov, thank you--sadly, we have run out of time. We will return with a final word.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: Our cartoon this week is from Wayne Stayskal of the Tampa Tribune, who visits the Oval Office. The Russians are still miffed because you wouldn't give up SDI. They want Daniloff back.

I'm Lesley Stahl, have a good week.

ANNOUNCER: This portion of FACE THE NATION was sponsored by the men and women of the General Motors Corporation. GM, mark of excellence.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 3, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH

SUBJECT: Research on Arbatov

Attached at Tab I, is a memo from you to John Tuck forwarding background information on Georgi Arbatov (Tab A). The Chief of Staff will appear with Arbatov on "Meet the Press" Sunday. In preparation, John requested that we compile Arbatov's recent statements on Summit related issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo and information.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Tuck

Tab A Arbatov Information

Prepared by:  
Joan R. Vail *JRV*